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Abstract 
The  following  analysis  provides  a  microeconomic  foundation  to  how  inflation  uncertainty 
adversely affects output by examining the impact of unpredictable inflation on credit markets. We 
claim that non-diversifiable risks such as inflation uncertainty will cause financial agents to act in 
a  risk-averse  manner.  Such  risk  aversion  will  adversely  affect  credit  markets  i)  directly  by 
reducing credit availability, and ii) indirectly by raising the cost of borrowing. Simultaneous 
Tobit  analysis  of  eight  countries  confirms  that  inflation  fluctuations  not  only  lead  to 
disequilibrium in these markets, but also negatively affect total amount of credit. 
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1 Introduction 
The increasing number of countries
1 (and lately the European Central Bank) adopting inflation 
targets as the primary objective of monetary policy is not only a compromise between rules and 
discretion, but also a pursuit to reduce adverse effects of inflation uncertainty. Numerous studies 
(Friedman, 1977; Froyen & Waud, 1987; Grier & Perry, 2000) have shown the harmful effects of 
unpredictable  inflation  on  macroeconomic  activity.  In  the  study  below,  we  provide  a 
microeconomic foundation to explain this negative effect by analyzing the effects of inflation 
uncertainty on credit markets. Analysis of eight countries reveals that inflation fluctuations not 
only lead to disequilibrium in these markets, but also negatively affect total amount of credit.  
Previous studies on the effects of inflation uncertainty on credit markets have resulted in 
different claims. On one hand, Ingersoll & Ross (1992), and Dixit (1994) claim that real interest 
rate and price uncertainty deters investors and pushes them to choose the “option to delay”. 
Landskroner & Ruthenberg (1985), and Miller (1992) also find that total credit is negatively 
affected by inflation uncertainty due to increased bank costs. On the other hand, Huizinga (1993), 
and George & Morriset (1995) claim that uncertainty of inflation will sometimes lead to higher 
profit fluctuations and may result in increased investment. Regardless of their conclusion, all of 
these papers share the assumption of equilibrium when characterizing credit markets. Such a 
depiction is rejected by the credit rationing literature (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1987), 
which claims that increased uncertainty in the economy causes the banks to ration credit and lead 
to disequilibrium in credit markets. They support this claim by empirical evidence that finds 
credit availability to be a significant explanatory variable in the determination of investment (Fry, 
1980; Blejer & Khan, 1984; Voridis, 1993), indicating a quantity constraint in the determination 
                                                 
1 Group of countries that adopted this regime consists of Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Czech Republic.   3 
of credit. These contentions of the credit rationing literature motivate our analysis of the effects of 
inflation uncertainty on credit markets, allowing for possibility of credit market disequilibrium.  
We base our model of credit markets on profit-maximizing risk-averse agents. We believe 
that risk aversion is a better characterization of agents (despite the traditional risk neutrality) in 
the existence of non-diversifiable risks such as inflation uncertainty. The outcome of such a 
supposition is the possibility of disequilibrium in credit markets or curbed credit. Similar to credit 
rationing models, disequilibrium is caused by a non-monotonic loan supply. We deviate from 
these models, however, since we contend that banks adverse reaction to a combination of credit 
and interest risks determines the shape of the loan supply, rather than information problems. 
Turning  our  attention  to  loan  demand,  we  notice  that  surprisingly  the  effect  of  inflation 
uncertainty on loan demand is ambiguous. The net effect depends on whether price changes more 
than  real  interest  rate  due  to  inflation  fluctuations.  Such  formulation  of  the  credit  markets 
provides a microeconomic basis for why inflation uncertainty reduces economic activity. 
The  empirical  part  tests  the  implications  of  the  theoretical  section,  namely  that  inflation 
uncertainty causes risk aversion, which in turn results in rationed credit. In order to validate such 
claims,  we  use  a  methodology  that  allows  for  the  existence  of  disequilibrium  in  the  credit 
markets. Utilizing Simultaneous Tobit estimation not only avoids distortions caused by possible 
censored data, but also enables precise determination of how loan demand and supply are affected 
by unpredictable inflation, even when one of them is not observed. Estimations confirm risk 
aversion and disequilibrium in majority of a sample of eight countries. More importantly, we find 
that inflation uncertainty adversely affects these credit markets, 1) directly by reducing credit 
availability, and 2) indirectly by raising the cost of borrowing. Results also show that inflation 
uncertainty has significant bearing on both developed and developing country credit markets 
regardless of their depth. 
Next section briefly explains the derivation of the theoretical model. Section three explains 
the estimation technique along with description of the data. In the fourth section, we present   4 
results of the empirical analysis on the eight countries used in the research. Concluding remarks 
appear in the paper’s final section. 
2 Model 
Our model assumes identically risk-averse agents on both sides of imperfect credit markets. Both 




G = P - P  
(where P represents profit and l is the coefficient for risk aversion
2). The setting of our model 
also includes asymmetric information, where firms know that there is a possibility of their loan 
applications can be rejected, and the banks know that there is a possibility of default on the loans 
granted. Such general formulation results in a credit market disequilibrium generated by a non-
monotonic loan supply. 
2.1 Loan Supply 
With n borrowers, the bank’s ex-post profit from borrower i (Pi) is: 
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with the balance sheet constraint, 
  ( ) 1 D L B F r - = + +   (2) 
where p is the exogenous probability of successful loan projects in the loan pool, F is the foreign 
currency holdings of the bank with 
2 ( , )
e
e e N e s % :  as the uncertain real depreciation (devaluation) 
of the domestic money; 
2 (0, ) N m m s %:  is the deviation from the optimal forecast of inflation p
e, 
and RL, RB and RD are the gross loan (L), bill (B), and deposit (D) rates
3, respectively. We deviate 
from the classic assumption of credit rationing models, p being a decreasing function of loan rate 
                                                 
2 The parameter l is determined by the tangency of the mean-variance efficient frontier with the banks’ or 
firms’ utility function, and so it reflects their behavior towards risk. The bank or the firm becomes more 
risk averse as l gets larger. 
3 Ri = 1+ ri   5 
for notational and mathematical simplicity. Risk aversion still leads to a non-monotonic loan 
supply when banks face a combination of interest and credit risks. 
In their maximization of the objective function, the banks use deposits to lend to a) the 
private sector in the form of loans, b) the government by purchasing highly liquid bills, or c) to 
speculate in the foreign exchange market (inflation hedge). Banks are price takers in the loan 
market if there is equilibrium in the market, and they are price setters otherwise. In other words, 
in cases where there is no market equilibrium, the banks choose the loan quantity and rate. The 
sources of uncertainty are the stochastic inflation rate (interest risk), which affects the real rates of 
the  assets  or  liabilities  in  the  bank’s  portfolio,  uncertainty  about  the  exchange  rate,  and  the 
probability of loan repayment (credit risk).  
Solution  to  the  maximization  of  the  banks’  objective  function  leads  to  three  significant 
comparative statics results. First, the loan supply is non-monotonic in the loan rate (backward 
bending). This backward bending supply is caused by the interaction of credit and interest risks in 
a  risk-averse  environment.  The  next  significant  result  is  the  negative  effect  of  inflation 
uncertainty on the loan quantity due to increases in interest risk deterring banks from lending. 
Last but not least, unpredictable inflation leads to climbing loan rates, indirectly reducing total 
lending via negative effects on loan demand. Other comparative statics, and optimal loan rate and 
quantity are displayed in Appendix and Table A1.  
Loan Demand 
We  utilize  a  flexible  accelerator  model  to  describe  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  in  the 
existence  of  capital  price  (real  interest  rate)  and  inflation  uncertainty.  In  this  framework,  n 
identical firms have the same distribution function for the return on the projects in which they 
intend to invest. Maximizing the same objective function as the banks with respect to investment,   6 
(
d
i L ), the firms use a Clower dual decision process
4 since they know that banks will meet their 
financing demand only at certain times (e.g., with probability t). The t will be endogenous since 
it is the probability of equilibrium,
d
i L L = ￿
5. The investment project outcome (Yi) of a typical 
firm is stochastic with a distribution function G(Y). Therefore, firms will prefer to default and get 
zero return if their project return is below the loan repayment value (or break-even rate)_ i.e., if  
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L R  is the real loan rate.  
Under these assumptions, a general form of profit for firm i is 
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, where 
*
i Y  and 
*
i K  are the existing levels of output capacity and capital respectively, w
* is the 
wage rate, 
d
i L  is the desired capital stock change ( )
*
i i K K - , and 
*
L R  and 
* p are the random real 
prices of capital and output. 
Maximization after the linearization of  i P  around 
*
i K and 
*
i Y gives us the optimal solution 
displayed in the Appendix. Comparative statics show that the effect of inflation uncertainty on 
loan demand is not as clear-cut as mentioned in previous studies (George & Morisset, 1995). Its 
impact will depend crucially on the comparison of real rate uncertainty (
2
r s ) and covariance 
between prices of capital and output ( , r p s ), both functions of inflation fluctuations (
2
m s ). Loan 
demand will increase if inflation uncertainty is the larger cause of covariance between prices of 
capital and output, since this correlation minimizes profit fluctuations. The reverse will be true if 
inflation fluctuations are the predominant reason of real rate uncertainty, since
2
r s  reduces the 
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5 This condition does not mean that the individual firm has control over altering their chances for loans.   7 
cost of delaying an investment project. Other relevant comparative statics results are summarized 
in Table A2.  
Combining the results from both sides of the credit market (Tables A1 and A2) gives us a 
system  that  can  be  described  with  the  graph  below.  The  following  section  will  devise  the 
estimation technique specific to such a scenario. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
3 Estimation Method and Data 
A linear representation of the solutions to the first order conditions, the loan supply and demand 
can be written as 
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  (5)    
where Xi are the exogenous variables, and  L R is the loan rate. Disturbances ui are assumed to be 
normal, with different variances and no covariance. 
Since the banks refuse to lend above a certain rate due to the increased variance in profits, 
this  scenario  is  similar  to  controlled  price  models  of  disequilibrium  econometric  techniques 
(Maddala, 1983). The price control in these models can be compared to the model’s maximum 
rate, obtained by the tangency point. The important difference from the previous models is that 
this interest rate is endogenous and determined by the tangency point of the loan demand and 
supply in Figure 1. In equilibrium, we have an ordinary simultaneous equations framework where 
d s L L L = = and 
*
L R is the prevailing interest rate, which equals 
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When a market-clearing rate does not exist, we observe the maximum loan rate 
m
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=   (7)      8 
and the loan quantity that corresponds to it. The observed loan quantity is always equal to the 
loan supply, and the regime switches to disequilibrium when loan demand exceeds supply and 
becomes unobservable. The indicator function  
  [ ] [ ]
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is determined according to whether the equilibrium interest rate exists or not.  
Since regime switches are not observable, we use Maddala & Nelson (1974) approach to 
derive  the  likelihood  function  suitable  for  the  model.  Given  the  joint  normal  distribution  of 
( ) 1 2 , g u u , the unconditional density function  ( ) l × for the loan rate and quantity is  
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The term in the first bracket describes the density of being in disequilibrium whereas the 
latter part describes equilibrium. Since there are two possible regimes with unobserved switches, 
this likelihood function is the sum of two conditional densities that span the possible outcomes 
multiplied by the probabilities
6 associated with them. In the equation above f is the joint density 
of L
d and L
s, derived by a transformation using the equations (5) treating L R as a constant at 
m
L R , 
that is, the transformation from( ) ( ) 1 2 , ,
s d u u L L ® . The integral sign is used to add this density 
function for all the possible values of L
d greater than L since these values are not observable. In 
other words, in this disequilibrium part of the unconditional density function, 
m
L L R R = , 
s L L = , 
and
d s L L > . The joint density h is also derived from density g, as in any simultaneous equations 
                                                 
6 We have used the unconditional probabilities rather than the conditional probabilities _for example, 
( )
d s P L L L > due to the controversial results about benefits of including them into the model. Even though 
Quandt & Rosen (1985) have found that conditional probabilities provide a sharper discrimination between 
the regimes, Burkett (1981) could not find any substantial differences between the two of them.   9 
model via a transformation from( ) ( ) 1 2 , , L u u L R ® ;  J  is the absolute value of the Jacobian of 
the  transformation  that  equals  1 1 2 2 L R b a a - + + .  The  economic  interpretation  of  the 
equilibrium  part  of  this equation 
s d L L L = = ,  and the interest rate  is  determined by  market 
equilibrium.   
Maximizing sum of the logs of equation (9) over the sample period enables us to estimate the 
parameters and answer some of the questions posited earlier in the introduction. We can also test 
for the existence of disequilibrium by using Hausman (1978), Revankar (1978), and Wu (1973) 
tests (HRW), which examine the interest rate' s dependence on the error terms. Viewing demand 
and supply equations as a simultaneous equations system, leads to the correlation of the error 
terms u1 and u2 to the interest rate in market equilibrium. In disequilibrium, however, loan rate is 
determined only by the banks’ optimization, not by the market equilibrium, causing independence 
between  the  interest  rate  and  all  error  terms.  Therefore,  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of 
independence between RL and either u1 or u2 points toward the presence of equilibrium
7. 
Data 
The first half of the sample countries (Brazil, Greece, Korea, and Mexico) have been chosen due 
to high levels of uncertainty in their economies despite having gone through financial reforms 
with considerable success
8. Inflation and exchange rate fluctuations are the main proxies utilized 
to represent the uncertainties in these countries. Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom are the developed countries chosen either through an inflationary period in their history 
(Italy and the UK) or the Kugler (1987) paper, which finds evidence of disequilibrium in these 
countries (Germany and Switzerland). 
We use quarterly data from 1980 to 1995 for the developing countries and longer sample 
periods  for  the  developed  countries  (1971-95  for  Germany,  1972-95  for  Italy,  1975-95  for 
                                                 
7 In the empirical results section, we test the correlation between interest rate and the supply error term (RL 
and u1) for each country to verify the results of the original tests.   10 
Switzerland, and finally 1968-95 for the UK). Explanatory variables used in the demand side 
(variables  in  matrix  X2)  of  the  credit  market  are:  inflation  uncertainty,  expected  price  level, 
expected project return, wage, and capital stock. We use expected industrial production as a 
proxy  for  the  project  return  while  deriving  capital  stock  from  quarterly  capital  formation
9. 
Independent  variables  on  the  supply  side  (X1)  are:  deposit  rate,  treasury  bill  rate,  expected 
inflation,  inflation  uncertainty,  expected  depreciation,  depreciation  uncertainty,  and  interest-
exchange rate covariance. 
In order to derive the uncertainty variables, we first estimate appropriate models for price 
level,  inflation,  exchange  rate  depreciation,  and  project  return  by  using  ARIMA  models, 
including other macro variables when necessary. Following the determination of the appropriate 
model, the predicted value is obtained as a proxy for the optimal forecast used by the agents in 
the  economy.  The  deviation  of  this  forecast  from  the  actual  observation  is  taken  to  be  the 
unpredictable part of inflation or exchange rate. We use the squares of these residuals (similar to 
Miller, 1992) as the proxies for inflation and exchange rate uncertainty. 
We have obtained the major portion of my quarterly data from the International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF, and completions have been attained from DataStream, OECD, publications 
by the Central Banks or the Bureaus of Statistics in these countries, and in some cases directly 
from the Central Banks. 
4 Empirical Results 
As previously mentioned, our research goals are threefold: (a) to determine whether the sample 
countries’ financial institutions and firms act in a risk averse fashion, (b) to ascertain whether or 
not there is disequilibrium in the sample countries, and (c) to search for direct and indirect effects 
of inflation uncertainty in credit markets. Simultaneous Tobit is used to derive the maximum 
likelihood estimates (Tables 1 and 2) for the whole model. We then utilize these estimates to 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Some higher inflation countries have been left out of the sample due to data availability.   11 
derive loan demand and supply projections. Significance of the uncertainty terms’ coefficients 
addresses  goal  ‘a’  above  while  use  of  demand  and  supply  projections  along  with  the  HRW 
technique
10  resolves  ‘b’. The  maximum  likelihood  coefficients  help  determine  the  direct  and 
indirect effects of inflation uncertainty --- namely, ‘c’.  
Reader should note that the countries analyzed do not always form clear-cut categories, and 
some assumptions may therefore be oversimplifications. Examples of these assumptions are the 
use of a uniform financial market model to represent the entire sample (both developing and 
developed  countries)  and  investigation  of  a  microeconomic  partial  equilibrium  framework 
utilizing  macro  data.  Therefore,  the  results  obtained  should  be  perceived  as  an  attempt  to 
understand the workings of financial markets with (price or quantity) constraints and uncertainties 
rather than as deterministic policy recommendations. Thus, this research may be considered more 
of a diagnostic analysis than a remedial one. 
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 here) 
Risk Aversion   
The findings displayed in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that almost all of the countries analyzed react to 
unpredictable part of inflation or exchange rate. The higher the uncertainty level in the country, 
the higher the number of these variances to which its financial institutions react. For instance, 
Brazil' s monetary authorities have been anything but predictable (at least until the introduction of 
the “real”). Consequently, all possible variance terms come out significant in our estimations for 
this country. Since inflation and exchange rate are highly variable, Brazil’s financial institutions 
have to consider not only the expected real returns of investments but also the fluctuations around 
them. At the other end of the spectrum, in Germany, the only significant variance term is the 
depreciation  uncertainty.  Since  Germany  has  a  very  conservative  central  bank,  it  has  been 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be zero. For some cases, where capital formation data is 
unavailable, quarterly capital stock values are interpolated from annual data. 
10 The F-statistic value obtained with their technique is compared to the critical value of  1,4 F    12 
extremely successful in reducing the public perception of uncertainty levels in inflation and the 
exchange rate. This credibility has allowed the German financial markets to enjoy protection from 
reacting unpredictable shocks to real returns. A surprising outcome is how the British financial 
institutions  include  the  uncertainty  around  inflation  and  exchange  rate  in  their  maximization 
function.  Even  in  Switzerland  with  a fairly  low  and  seemingly  stable inflation,  the financial 
markets show wariness about the inflation fluctuations and incorporate them into their decision 
process.  In  fact,  every  sample  financial  market  other  than  Germany’s  included  inflation 
uncertainty  in  their  portfolio  decisions.  Therefore,  our  assumption  of  risk-averse  financial 
institutions  is  validated  by  our  estimations  proving  that  systemic  risks,  which  cannot  be 
diversified by these agents, will affect their decision process.  
Disequilibrium 
The  assertion  of  backward  bending  loan  supply  leading  to  disequilibrium  is  unambiguously 
supported by 4 of the 8 countries analyzed. Tests on Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Italy not only 
gave  low  F-statistics  on  the  HRW  tests  (Table  3),  but  they  also  displayed  significant  non-
monotonicity  of  loan  supply.  Confirmation  of  risk  aversion  from  above  coupled  with  this 
disequilibrium evidence strengthens the of the theoretical section, which link emergence of credit 
market imbalance due to high levels of non-diversifiable risk.  
HRW F-test and non-monotonic loan supply results derived here for Germany conflict with 
the lack of evidence for risk aversion in the previous section. Its coefficient estimates capturing a 
backward bending loan supply hint for disequilibrium due to high levels of credit risk, especially 
around the time of interest rate hikes during the OPEC oil crises and the German unification
11. 
The remaining three countries in the sample --- Greece, Switzerland, and the UK --- gave out 
mixed signals in terms of accordance with the findings of the theoretical section. Switzerland 
pointed toward equilibrium when tested for the independence of the error terms from the interest 
rate even though a backward bending loan supply was obtained from the ML estimations. The   13 
combination of their concave loan supply with a relatively steep loan demand indicates possible 
correlation between the loan rate and the error term
12. Switzerland was not the only country that 
gave out mixed signals, however. Greece and the UK both displayed convex loan supplies even 
though their F-statistic indicated existence of disequilibrium. Greece had the majority of data 
points  on  the  negative  sloped  region  of  the  loan  supply  indicating  a  market  disequilibrium 
(consistent  with  F-statistic  from  the  HRW  test)  caused  by  financial  repression  and  possibly 
negative real rates. The UK, on the other hand, required further tests since the majority of loan 
rate data points are above the inflection point. Subsequent tests show that a sluggish adjustment 
of loan rates to excess demand
13 in the credit markets is responsible for the F-statistic’s pointing 
toward disequilibrium. 
Effects of Inflation Uncertainty 
Table  4  summarizes  the  direct  or  indirect  (through  the  loan  rates)  effects  of  inflation 
uncertainty  on  credit  markets.  Comparative  statics  derived  from  the  model  claim  that 
unpredictable inflation would raise interest rates, decrease loan supply, and affect loan demand 
depending on the comparison between the real rate uncertainty and the covariance of output to 
capital prices. Along with the direct effects displayed in Tables 1 and 2, most of these countries 
also show signs of indirect influence of inflation fluctuations causing increases in the interest 
rates. The only country with no direct or indirect effect is Germany, which of course has the most 
conservative  and  credible  monetary  authority  among  the  sample  countries.  In  general,  the 
estimations display that most of the remaining seven countries have coefficients of the expected 
sign in both the direct and indirect effects for inflation uncertainty variable. A close inspection of 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 This result is more in line with credit rationing argument of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). 
12 This correlation is probably due to our choice of inflation hedge used in the loan supply, namely the use 
of exchange rate and omission of foreign interest rates. Since Swiss banks hold a very high level of foreign 
securities in their portfolio, and since Swiss banks'  loan rate is very highly correlated to the German T-Bill 
rate, the use of a simplistic model designed more for developing country credit markets may have been 
polluting the disequilibrium test, causing the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
13 Claims of slow adjusting loan rates is not in conflict with Kugler’s (1987) not finding any evidence for 
sluggish interest rates since his analysis ends in 1983, the beginning year of sluggish rates in my analysis.   14 
the results reveal that adverse effects of inflation fluctuations are enhanced when financial market 
uncertainties (e.g., credit risk) are high. 
(Table 4 here) 
Some  unpredicted  and  anomalous  results  are  also  apparent  in  Table  1.  For  instance,  the 
positive  sign  for  the  coefficients  of  inflation  uncertainty  in  the  loan  supply  (in  Greece  and 
Mexico) cannot be explained by the theoretical workings of this paper. The Greek result, namely 
the positive relation between the loan supply and the inflation uncertainty, is likely caused by the 
coincident decreases in both after financial liberalization. Most firms turned to either foreign 
banks or the stock market to meet their financing needs. In the Mexican case, a similar trend in 
the  opposite  direction  can  be  shown  as  the  reason  for  their  anomaly:  increasing  inflation 
uncertainty coincides with rising loan supply, especially after interest rate deregulation, due to the 
rapid  expansion  of  the  financial  markets  (30%  to  50%  increase  in  M4).  However,  a  closer 
investigation of the structure of these countries’ financial markets may shed more light to these 
anomalous results. 
5 Conclusion 
This  paper  analyzes  the  effects  of  inflation  uncertainty  on  credit  markets  by  using  a 
disequilibrium framework. The theoretical section displays how inflation uncertainty increases 
the risks associated with the portfolios of firms and banks, cause these agents to act risk aversely, 
and create grounds for disequilibrium. The empirical section confirms our assumptions of risk 
aversion and disequilibrium, establishing that use of a disequilibrium estimation technique is 
called for in sample credit markets. Tests on both developed and developing countries show that 
inflation  uncertainty  has  significant  bearing  on  credit  markets  either  directly  or  indirectly 
regardless  of  depth of financial  markets. Therefore,  the  removal  of  inflation uncertainty  will 
decrease the risk around these contracts and will ensure efficiency and growth of investment in a 
country. Evidence in this research strengthens the argument for inflation targeting and explains its 
rising popularity as the choice of monetary policy.    15 
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In disequilibrium loan rate and quantity are: 

















Corresponding comparative statics results are: 
 
(Insert Table A1 here) 
 
Solving for optimal investment level gives us 



















( ) ( )





i L r i
i L i
A pR Y Y
A R p Y Y
p s
t
= - - ×
= - - - ×
 
 
Corresponding comparative statics results are: 
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Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Coefficients of the Loan Supply Equation 
L






















*  .05  -.36





**  .02  -.05
**  1.14  .78  -.095  -.83  -.014 
cov( , ) e m %%  -.003
**  -.001  -.007  -.48
*  .16  .007  -.057  -0.085
** 
2









e s   .0004
**  .021  .014  .26  -5.32
**  -1.71  0.17  .018
* 
e p   .021
**  -9.03
*  -.37  .078  -.65
**  -.25
*  -.10
**  1.25 
Note: 
** indicates significance at 5% while 




Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Coefficients of the Loan Demand Equation 
L
d variable  Brazil  Greece  Korea  Mexico  Germany  Italy  Swiss  UK 
*



















, r p s   .05
*  -.012  -.03  .038  .002  .011
*  .07  -0.23 
2
m s   .0014
**  -.062
*  .0004




i i Y Y -   .078
**  .0046







p   .042  .12
*  .028
**  .026  9.54
**  -.069
**  .029
**  1.12 
Note: 
** indicates significance at 5% while 
* is 10%. 
 
 




  Table 3: F-statistics results from the disequilibrium (HRW) test 
Country  Brazil  Greece  Korea  Mexico  Germany  Italy  Switzerland  UK 
F-statistic  7.15  2.32  0.25  6.43  0.013  5.19  10.38
**  3.23 
Note:  F-statistics are compared with the 5% critical value of  1,4 7.71 F = . Values above this level are 
indicated by 










Table 4: Direct and Indirect Effects of Inflation Uncertainty on Credit Markets 
Country  Direct Effect (on loans)  Indirect Effect (on rates) 
Brazil  s L  ¯ , 
d L  ­  None 
Greece  s L  ­ , 
d L  ¯  L R  ­ 
Korea  s L  ¯ , 
d L  ­  L R  ­ 
Mexico  s L  ­  L R  ­ 
Germany  None  None 
Italy  s L  ¯  L R  ­ (lagged effect) 
Switzerland  s L  ¯ , 
d L  ¯  None 
UK  s L  ¯ , 
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Table A1: Comparative statics results for loan supply 
Variable  Symbol  Sign 
Loan rate  RL  / + -  
Deposit rate  RD  - 
T-Bill rate  RB  - 
Hedging factor  cov( , ) e m %%  - 
Inflation uncertainty  2
m s   - 
Exchange rate uncertainty  2
e s   + 









Table A2: Comparative statics results for loan demand 
Variable  Symbol  Sign 
Real loan rate  *
L R   - 
Wage  w
*  - 
Covariance of capital and output 
prices 
, r p s   + 
Inflation uncertainty  2
m s   / + -  
Expected return   *
i i Y Y -   + 
Expected price  *
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Ls,Ld
L1
d (market clearing)
L3
d (excess demand)
Ls
rL
*
L2
d (market clearing)
rL
 rL
*= rL
m
L2 L1
 